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Defendant and Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 981585-CA
Priority No. 2

]

REPLY OF THE APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment
Eighth District Court
Uintah County, State of Utah
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Kandice Jean Hatch, Defendant and Appellant, through counsel, appeals her jury
convictions on three counts: count (I), burglary of a non-dwelling, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1973); count (II), theft by deception, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1973); and count (III),
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theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973). The
court of appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1
Did the trial court err in allowing the prosecutor to introduce Rule 609(a)
impeachment evidence against Hatch when the evidence consisted of Hatch's guilty pleas
to two counts of felony forgery in a separate court action but she had not yet been
sentenced in that matter? Standard of review: Whether evidence is admissible is a
question of law which the court of appeals reviews for correctness incorporating a clearly
erroneous standard of review. Furthermore, in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit
evidence, the court of appeals will not reverse that ruling unless a substantial right of the
party has been affected. State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah App.1993).
Issue 2
Did the trial court err in allowing the prosecutor to introduce Rule 608(a)
character evidence against Hatch when the evidence consisted of a police officer's
testimony about his impression of Hatch's veracity when he interviewed her as well as
her reputation in the community for untruthfulness? Standard of review: Whether
evidence is admissible is a question of law which the court of appeals reviews for
correctness incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review. Furthermore, in
2

reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, the court of appeals will not reverse
that ruling unless a substantial right of the party has been affected. Diaz, supra, at 23.
Issue 3
Did reversible prosecutorial misconduct occur when the prosecutor introduced
Rule 609 and Rule 608 evidence against Hatch and also asserted personal knowledge
and belief about disputed facts and the guilt of the accused? Standard of review: The
court of appeals will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if defendant
has shown that the actions or remarks of prosecuting counsel call to the attention of the
jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict, and, if so,
under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial and
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would
have been a more favorable result. State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah
App.1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
Issue 4
Was there reversible cumulative error? Standard of review: The court of appeals
will reverse a conviction if the cumulative effect of several errors undermines the court's
confidence that defendant was given a fair trial. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 550
(Utah App. 1998).
Issue 5
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Hatch on each of the three counts with
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which she was charged? Standard of review: The court of appeals reviews the evidence
and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict and will reverse only if that evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which she was convicted. State v. Longshaw, 961
P.2d 925, 931 (Utah App.1998).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISONS.
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Hatch initially was charged with three counts: count (I), burglary of a nondwelling, a third degree felony; count (II), theft by deception, a class A misdemeanor;
and count (III), theft, a class A misdemeanor. Count (II) subsequently was amended to
theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor.
B. Course of Proceedings
Preliminary hearing was held on December 10, 1997. Hatch was bound over on,
and denied, all three counts. A one-day jury trial was held on March 11, 1998. The jury
found Hatch guilty on all counts.
C. Disposition at Trial Court

4

The trial count sentenced Hatch on August 4, 1998 as follows: count (I), burglary
of a non-dwelling, a third degree felony, zero to five years in state prison and a $1,000
fine; count (II), theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor, six months in jail and a $250
fine; and count (III), theft, a class A misdemeanor, one year in jail and a $500 fine.
Prison and jail terms were to be served concurrently. The court also ordered Hatch to
pay restitution in the amount of $4,200 to Grace Sharp and $705 to Bill Wilson.
RELEVANT FACTS
Because Hatch is appealing from a jury verdict, she recites the facts in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict but presents conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to
clarify issues raised on appeal. State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah App.1996).
In August 1996 Bill Wilson rented a storage unit at Seeley's Storage in Vernal,
Utah. He placed numerous items of personal property in the unit. Many belonged to his
ex-wife, Grace Sharp. On February 28, 1997, when Wilson was at the unit, everything
was in order. However, on March 15, 1997, when Wilson returned to pick up a washing
machine, he noticed that the latch on the unit had been broken off. The contents of
boxes were strewn about. A stereo cabinet was destroyed. Certain items including
household furniture were missing. Wilson immediately called the police. Deputy
Anthony Byron, Uintah County Sheriffs Office, responded. When asked, Wilson told
Byron that he suspected Hatch and her daughters of breaking into the unit and stealing
items. Tr. 114-16, 126, 155-57.
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On March 19, 1999 Hatch went to Jiffy Pawn in Vernal. She had with her a
saddle. The saddle had been given to Sharp as a child by her father. Hatch sold the
saddle to the pawn shop for fifty dollars. She executed a bill of sale, providing
her name, date of birth and driver's license ID number. Tr. 145-47,233-34.
The above facts were undisputed at trial. Disputed, however, was whether the
saddle had been in Wilson's storage unit at the time of the burglary, as well as whether
Wilson had given the saddle to Hatch and therefore Hatch was in rightful possession
when she sold it. Hatch testified that in mid-March 1997 Wilson came to her residence
and gave her the saddle, as compensation for items of personal property that he had taken
from a separate storage unit containing her belongings. Tr. 231-33, 257-58. Hatch's
version of events was supported by the testimony of a daughter, Mandy, who stated that
she was present when the discussion between Wilson and Hatch occurred. Tr. 211-15.
Another defense witness, Joseph King, testified that he saw the saddle at Hatch's
residence and that Hatch told him that Wilson had given it to her. Tr. 220-21. On the
other hand, Wilson testified that the saddle was in his storage unit in March 1997 and
that he never had given it to Hatch or told her she could keep it. Tr. 158, 161-63, 17576, 267-68. Sharp testified that she gave the saddle to Wilson to put in storage in
January 1997 and that she never authorized him to dispose of it in any manner. Tr. 18283.
There were no witnesses to the burglary and theft. Fingerprints were not taken at
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the crime scene. Tr. 126-27. No stolen property, except for the allegedly stolen saddle,
was ever found in Hatch's possession or linked to her. Therefore the case boiled down to
the word of Wilson against the word of Hatch. Credibility was all important. In the end,
the jury believed Wilson and inferred from his testimony, along with the undisputed fact
that Hatch had sold the saddle to Jiffy Pawn, that Hatch must have burglarized the
storage unit, taken all of the missing property and received fifty dollars for the saddle by
deception.
During trial, the prosecutor repeatedly attacked Hatch's credibility using improper
means. The prosecutor impeached Hatch by referring to her guilty pleas to two counts of
felony forgery in a separate court action, even though she had not yet been sentenced in
that matter. See Tr. 109, 238-48, 253, 279-80,291. He also had a police officer testify
about his impression of Hatch's veracity as well as her reputation in the community for
untruthfulness, despite lack of proper foundation. See Tr. 108-09, 196-99, 248-52, 260,
261-63, 280. Finally, the prosecutor asserted personal knowledge and belief about
disputed facts and the guilt of the accused. See Tr. 108-09. These attacks, Hatch
believes, swayed the jury in its determination of whom to believe and led directly to the
adverse outcome that she had at trial.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Hatch has preserved, for purposes of appeal, the issue of the prosecutor's
improper use of Rule 609(a) evidence against her, specifically her guilty pleas to two
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counts of felony forgery pending sentencing. It was not necessary for Hatch to make any
contemporaneous objection below because the trial court ruled, sua sponte, that the
evidence was admissible and furthermore objection would have been futile. Also, in her
original brief, in the process of setting forth her claim using the correctness standard,
Hatch completely satisfied the three-prong test for plain error, assuming that the court of
appeals wishes to consider plain error. The State's waiver and non-preservation
arguments should be rejected, too, on grounds that an appellate court has inherent
authority to consider any and all issues if doing so is necessary to a proper decision.
Accordingly, the court of appeals should reach and rule on the merits of Hatch's claim
that Rule 609(a) evidence was improperly admitted and the error affected her substantial
rights at trial.
Hatch also has preserved, for purposes of appeal, the prosecutor's improper use of
Rule 608(a) evidence against her. The same time that the trial court, sua sponte,
considered Rule 609(a) evidence, it conducted a colloquy about Rule 608(a) and
expressly ruled that Sergeant Hatzidakis, a State's witness, would be allowed to testify
about Hatch's reputation for untruthfulness. Therefore the matter was preserved; in
addition objection would have been futile. More particularly, it was improper for the
prosecutor to ask Hatzidakis, as a rebuttal witness, to testify as to the credibility of
Hatch's statements made during the course of trial. The prosecutor also failed to lay
adequate foundation regarding Hatzidakis' testimony about the reputation of Hatch in
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community for truthfulness or untruthfulness, that is, just when the reputation existed
and just who the members of the community were.
Hatch has preserved the issue of prosecutorial misconduct because, in setting forth
and meeting the test for misconduct, she also satisfied the test for plain error. The
prosecutor's introduction of both Rule 609(a) and Rule 608(a) evidence against Hatch
rose to the level of misconduct. Also, certain comments of the prosecutor in opening
statement rose to that level. A prosecutor may not express his or her personal knowledge
of the facts in issue or personal opinion as to the truth or falsity of testimony, the guilt of
the accused, or the justness of the prosecution, as happened here. Contrary to the State's
claim, the actions of the prosecutor were not cured by a short comment of the trial court,
prior to opening statements, or Jury Instruction No. 20.
The cumulative effect of the errors that occurred in Hatch's trial undermines
confidence in the outcome. The court of appeals cannot say, with any degree of
confidence, that Hatch received a fair trial below.
Finally, Hatch submits, as briefed, the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence on
the three counts on which she was convicted.
ARGUMENT
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE
The State, through its brief, seeks to insulate Hatch's conviction despite the fact
that it was obtained in contravention of standards developed to afford defendants their
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basic rights.
The State does not dispute that Hatch's guilty pleas to two counts of felony
forgery, pending sentencing, were not admissible to impeach her trial testimony and
otherwise attack her credibility under Rule 609(a), given well-established case law in this
jurisdiction. It argues, however, that Hatch failed to preserve the issue for purposes of
appeal or in the alternative she suffered no unfair prejudice at trial. See generally Br.
Appellee 12-17.
Hatch did not object to the prosecutor questioning her about her guilty pleas on
cross-examination or making reference to them in opening statement, closing argument,
and rebuttal. She conceded this point in her original brief and she concedes it again
now. Nonetheless, in the facts and circumstances of the case, Hatch's lack of objection
to introduction of Rule 609(a) evidence against her cannot be considered to constitute
waiver of the issue and is not fatal to her claim of prejudicial error below. As Hatch has
pointed out, and as the State does not dispute, the trial court sua sponte halted trial and
called the prosecutor and defense counsel into chambers. It stated, "We are in chambers,
and at the court's request, I am going to go over whatever the parties want to get into as
to the record, criminal record of the defendant. And I do that because if it's not
admissible, I don't want to prejudice the jury." Tr. 236,11. 8-13. In other words, the
trial court itself raised and considered the issue of the admissibility of Hatch's guilty
pleas, among other matters in her criminal record. Its ultimate ruling on the issue is,
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necessarily, subject to appellate review. This basic principle was reiterated most recently
by the Utah supreme court in State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 408 n.4 (Utah 1999):
Ordinarily, the failure to properly preserve an issue for
appeal by means of an objection in the trial court,
stating the specific grounds for the objection, constitutes a waiver of that issue. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1).
However, in the past we have considered issues not
properly preserved by objection in the trial court where
the trial court, in spite of the lack of an objection, considered the issue sua sponte. See State v. Johnson, 821
P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991).
Because, in this case, the trial court ruled sua sponte that Rule 609(a) evidence could
come in against Hatch, the matter was preserved and it was not necessary for Hatch to
make any contemporaneous objection on the record.
It also was not necessary for Hatch to object to introduction of Rule 609(a)
evidence against her because the trial court had fully considered the matter and made its
decision and therefore objection would have been futile. "It is well established that the
law does not require litigants to do a futile or vain act." Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892,
901 (Utah App. 1996) (cited with approval in Roundy v. Staley, 374 Utah Adv. Rep. 15,
16,

P.2d

(Utah App. 1999).

Hatch's claim of prejudicial error below should be reviewed using a correctness
standard. As a result, despite the State's assertion to the contrary, it was not incumbent
upon Hatch explicitly to argue plain error or exceptional circumstances in her original
brief. However, such argument, which actually is present in the brief, is sufficient for
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purposes of review if the court of appeals wishes to consider plain error. Hatch has
identified an error, specifically use of her guilty pleas to felony forgery, pending
sentencing, to impeach her under Rule 609(a). Br. Appellant 10-13. She has shown
how the error was or should have been obvious to the trial court, in light of wellestablished case law including State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1990), State v.
Duncan, 812 P.2d 60 (Utah App. 1991) and State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19 (Utah App.
1993). Id. at 13-15. She also has shown, theoretically, with reference to empirical
research, and practically, with reference to the facts of this case, how the error was
harmful to her and absent the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome at trial. Id. at 15-18. For these reasons Hatch, in her original brief, has
completely satisfied the three-prong test for plain error set forth in State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
The State also argues that Hatch suffered no unfair prejudice because her pleas
have since become convictions and the jury received no information about her that it was
not ultimately entitled to receive. However, the State misses the significance of Hatch's
claim. The fact is that the jury, at the time of trial, was not entitled to know about
Hatch's pleas. A mere guilty plea, prior to sentencing, may not be equated with an
actual conviction. It was improper for the prosecutor to use the pleas to impeach Hatch
or even refer to them at any point in the trial. Furthermore, even assuming, for the sake
of argument, that any new jury could be told about her convictions, the prosecutor's
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impeachment would not take the form it did and Hatch would not be harmed in the way
she was in this case because of surprise. Anticipating that the prosecutor likely would
attempt to make use of Hatch's actual convictions for forgery, counsel could make every
effort to bar the prosecutor's reference to them in opening statement, on grounds, for
example, that Hatch would decide whether or not to testify only after the State had
presented its case in chief. Counsel could inform the jury about Hatch's criminal record
and thereby cushion the potentially devastating effect that such a record has on the
outcome of a trial on other, unrelated charges. See Br. Appellant 15-16. Counsel could
have rehabilitative witnesses ready to testify if the prosecutor attacked her credibility on
cross-examination. Counsel also could obtain a jury instruction cautioning that
conviction of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement does not mean, necessarily,
that Hatch was testifying dishonestly or falsely now. Hatch seeks no "windfall," as the
State asserts. Rather, she desires only a fair trial where her substantial rights are
protected rather than ignored and negatively affected.
Finally, Hatch believes that the State, in making the technical arguments that it
has, manifests a callous disregard for her right to a fair trial and prefers to uphold her
conviction rather than seek justice whatever the result. There is no doubt that, in years
past, appellants have sought review of matters that they indifferently failed to object to
and preserve below. Arguably, however, the pendulum has shifted too far in the
direction of automatic deference to waiver and non-preservation arguments, with the
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result that appellate courts may be failing to reach meritorious claims and truly pursue
the ends of justice. The Utah supreme court seems to have signaled dissatisfaction
regarding this very matter when it recently observed,
The Washington Supreme Court has stated that "[a]n appellate
court has inherent authority to consider issues which the parties
have not raised if doing so is necessary to a proper decision."
[Citations omitted.] We agree with this statement of law.
In our view, an overlooked or abandoned argument should not
compel an erroneous result. We should not be forced to ignore
the law just because the parties have not raised or pursued
obvious arguments.
Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1998). In this
case, the court of appeals should consider the issue that Hatch has raised. It is necessary
to a proper decision. Accordingly, Hatch asks that the court reject the State's arguments
and instead rule on the merits of her claim that the trial court erred when improper Rule
609(a) evidence repeatedly was used against her and the error affected her substantial
rights at trial.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
This appeal may be disposed of solely on the basis of the improper use of Rule
609(a) evidence against Hatch. If the court of appeals agrees, with Hatch, that the trial
court erred in admitting the evidence and further that Hatch's substantial rights were
affected, the appropriate remedy is reversal of her conviction and remand for a new trial.
Hatch would be satisfied with this result.
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No other, separate ground for reversal and remand needs to be considered. Still,
Hatch maintains that such grounds exist. One is that the trial court erred in allowing the
prosecutor repeatedly to make improper use of Rule 608(a) character evidence against
her.
The State, in its brief, does not dispute and apparently concedes that error
occurred when the prosecutor, in opening statement, said to the jury, "And then we'll
also ask you to listen to Sergeant Hatzidakis as he tells you what happened when he went
to confront the defendant and how her story shifted and changed to suit what might be
most convenient, and how he didn't think he could believe her simply because she was
telling a shifting story." Tr. 108,1. 23 to 109,1. 4. This in fact was error, as Hatch
demonstrated in her original brief. Under Rule 608(a), as well as State v. Rimmasch,
115 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1989), a witness may not testify as to the credibility of
statements made by another person on a particular occasion. See Br. Appellant 19.
Also, Hatch's substantial rights were affected. In the opening statement, even before
Hatzidakis testified, the jury was allowed to hear that a police officer, presumably an
upstanding member of the community, was convinced she was a liar. The jury, at this
critical point in the trial, was invited if not actually told to believe that Hatch was a liar.
Next, even if there was no prejudicial error when Hatzidakis testified about Hatch
on direct examination, it occurred when the prosecutor called him to testify as a rebuttal
witness. See Br. Appellant 20-22. This issue is subject to appellate review because at
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the same time that the trial court, sua sponte, invited the prosecutor and defense counsel
into chambers to discuss Rule 609(a) evidence, it conducted a colloquy about Rule
608(a) and expressly ruled that Hatzidakis would be allowed to testify about Hatch's
reputation for untruthfulness. See Tr. 248-52. The matter was preserved, and Hatch was
not required to make any contemporaneous objection on the record when Hatzidakis
testified as a rebuttal witness. State v. Jaeger, supra, at 408 n.4. Objection also would
have been futile as the court already had considered the matter and made its ruling.
Beltran v. Allan, supra, at 901.
Hatch continues to believe that the prosecutor improperly asked Hatzidakis to
comment on the credibility of her trial testimony when he asked, "Sergeant... you just
heard the defendant testify that she's only dealt with you on two occasions over those
twelve years that you have been here in town. Would you please tell the jury whether
that's accurate or not?" Tr. 260,11. 5-9. The prosecutor was entitled to ask Hatzidakis
how many times Hatch and he had had contact, then, in closing argument for example, to
highlight any discrepancy in the testimony of the two. However, the prosecutor should
not have had Hatzidakis say, in so many words, that Hatch lied about the extent of their
contact. One witness may not testify as to the credibility of statements made by another
person on a particular occasion. Rule 608(a); State v. Rimmasch, supra, at 392.
Hatch also continues to believe that it was necessary for the prosecutor, when he
asked Hatzidakis about Hatch's reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness, to lay
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foundation as to the existence of that reputation at the time of trial. This issue, while
important, appears relatively unexamined, with no discussion in Utah and little
elsewhere. See United States v. Null 415 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1969), which both Hatch
and the State cite in support; see also United States v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir.
1973). In any event, the State does not dispute that the prosecutor failed to lay
foundation as to reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness, either at the time of trial or
any time prior to trial. It merely asserts that there is no extant authority mandating such
foundation. To the extent that the prosecutor failed to lay foundation, assuming that it
was required, the question to Hatzidakis about Hatch's reputation was improper and
should not have been allowed.
Finally, Hatch continues to believe that it also was necessary for the prosecutor to
lay foundation as to the exact nature of the community in which Hatch's reputation for
truthfulness or untruthfulness existed. Defense counsel, at trial, repeatedly objected to
the prosecutor's failure to identify the "community" to which he referred when
questioning Hatzidakis, other than the law enforcement community. Eventually, the trial
court overruled counsel, saying that that was an issue for cross-examination. See Tr.
261-63. This issue was preserved for appeal not only because of the court's in-chambers
colloquy, sua sponte, about Rule 608(a) but defense counsel's timely and specific
objections. Stated in its essential terms, the issue is whether a proponent of Rule 608(a)
evidence, when referring to reputation "in the community" for truthfulness or
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untruthfulness, must lay adequate foundation as to who the people in that community
are. The State claims that Hatch offers no authority in support for this position.
However, none is required, as the principle involved is fundamental and obvious: it
always is the responsibility of proponents of any kind of evidence, including reputation
evidence, to lay proper foundation before it becomes admissible. The burden always is
on the proponent to set forth foundation affirmatively. The task of challenging it,
without it first being established, cannot be imposed on the non-proponent as the trial
court did in this case. The State offers no authority in opposition. Hatch therefore
submits the question to the court of appeals, on the basis of briefing completed by her
and the State.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
The State, in its brief, ignores Hatch's claim that the prosecutor's introduction of
Rule 609(a) and 608(a) evidence against her rose to the level of misconduct. Instead, it
challenges the related claim that certain remarks of the prosecutor in opening statement
constituted misconduct. See generally Br. Appellee 26-29.
The State argues first that Hatch failed to preserve her claim. Hatch concedes
again, as she did in her original brief, that she did not object to the prosecutor's opening
statement. Nevertheless, Hatch on appeal has demonstrated that the prosecutor erred,
specifically by asserting personal knowledge and belief about disputed facts and the guilt
of the accused. This occurred when the prosecutor said to the jury,
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But you are here to do one thing, and that's to find the
truth. And the truth is this defendant got mad, she tore
up Bill Wilson's storage shed, busted up his entertainment center. She took the saddle. ...Saddle went down
to Jiffy Pawn. Jiffy Pawn made out the money. They
are out the money. Grace is out the saddle. And the
defendant is here today to answer for it. Tr. 109,11.
13-22 (emphasis added),
and
And after the case is over, the best thing here today is,
/ am going to be able to give Grace her saddle back.
Tr. 108,11. 15-17.
The State suggests, with no small understatement, that the prosecutor's remarks "here
may well lean more towards argument than an evidentiary overview." Br. Appellee 27.
Indeed. But the statements are even more than argument. They represent assertions of
personal knowledge and belief about facts that were in dispute at trial, as well as Hatch's
guilt. The prosecutor erred in casting his opening statement in the form that he did.
Furthermore, as Hatch has demonstrated, there are black-letter professional standards
and Utah case law stating that a prosecutor may not express his or her personal
knowledge of the facts in issue or personal opinion as to the truth or falsity or testimony,
the guilt of the accused, or the justness of the prosecution. The prosecutor's error, in
other words, was or should have been obvious. See Br. Appellant 27-28. Finally, Hatch
has shown that the error was harmful to her. It unfairly exploited the prosecutor's
standing and prestige with the jury. It came at a time when the jury was forming its first
and perhaps lasting impression of the case. It told the jury what to think and believe, in a
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case that essentially was a swearing contest between Hatch and Wilson. Id. at 28-29.
Hatch, then, in setting forth and meeting the test for reversible prosecutorial misconduct,
State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897
(Utah 1993), also has satisfied the three-prong test for plain error.
The State also argues that the jury did not hear anything in the prosecutor's
opening statement that it was not entitled to hear in closing argument. Br. Appellee 28.
The argument misses the point. Hatch agrees that prosecutors have considerable latitude,
in closing argument, to argue the evidence and shape the thinking of the jury. That is,
perhaps, why it is called argument. However, opening statement is not opening
argument, despite the preference of the prosecutor in this case. It is rather an opportunity
for both sides, the prosecutor and defense counsel, to provide the jury with an overview
of the facts that each intends to prove. State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah
1982). It is a general statement of the case to be presented for the consideration and
verdict of the jury, not a statement of what specifically the true facts are and what
specifically the jury should conclude. Opening statement and closing argument have
totally different purposes and should not be confused with one another.
When confusion takes place, as it did here, it is extremely questionable whether
"the evil to be guarded against," State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989),
may be cured. The State wishes the court of appeals to believe that the short comment of
the trial court, Tr. 87, and gnomic Jury Instruction No. 20 were fully appreciated and
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understood by the jury and sufficient to inoculate it from the error that occurred. Br.
Appellee 28. However, in this case, the court's comment that anything that either the
prosecutor or defense counsel said was "not evidence," which the court gave to the jury
prior to opening statements, was arguably ineffective. The comment was brief, in the
abstract, and accompanied by numerous other comments about various matters. Also,
because the prosecutor immediately ignored what the trial court had warned against and
in effect presented evidence and told the jury it was truthful, and Hatch made no
objection at the time, the jury only could have had the impression that the prosecutor
had done nothing wrong and should be believed. Likewise, Jury Instruction No. 20 was
given in the abstract, without any reference to the prosecutor's opening statement, and
the jury only could have had thought that it had no application to opening. So-called
curative instructions, to be curative, must immediately follow error. See James W.
Gunson, Comment, Prosecutorial Summation: Where is the Line Between "Personal
Opinion" and Proper Argument?\ 46 Me.L.Rev. 241, 258 (1994) ("The primary
determining factor with regard to the efficacy of the curative instruction is the force and
immediacy of the corrective action."). Hatch believes that, in the totality of the
circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial court's one comment prior to opening
statements, or Jury Instruction No. 20, was sufficient to cure the prosecutor's improper
statements. For further discussion about this important matter, see also Footnote 9 in
Justice Russon's majority opinion, along with Justice Durham's concurring opinion, in
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State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998).
CUMULATIVE ERROR
Yet another, separate ground for reversal and remand is cumulative error. As
Hatch has argued in her original brief, cumulative error occurred with regard to the
prosecutor's improper use of Rule 609(a) evidence because he referred to Hatch's guilty
pleas not just once but numerous times in opening statement, cross-examination, closing
argument, and rebuttal. In addition, cumulative error occurred when the prosecutor
improperly introduced Rule 608(a) evidence against Hatch in his case-in-chief, and
improperly asserted his personal knowledge of the facts in issue and his personal opinion
about the truth or falsity of testimony, Hatch's guilt and the justness of the prosecution in
opening statement. The errors clearly were harmful cumulatively even if they were
harmless individually. Hatch persists in believing that the cumulative effect of the errors
that occurred in her trial undermines confidence in the outcome and further that the
court of appeals cannot confidently say, looking at her case as a whole, that she received
a fair trial below.
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Again, this appeal may be disposed of narrowly, on the basis of one assignment of
error by Hatch, namely the improper introduction of Rule 609(a) evidence against her.
However, if the court wishes to consider Hatch's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence on the three counts on which she was convicted below, she submits this issue
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without further argument, believing that evidence has been sufficiently marshaled in
"Relevant Facts," supra, and fully argued by both her and the State, or in the alternative
its review is necessary to a proper decision as the Utah supreme court has discussed in
Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, supra, at 464.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals should reverse Hatch's convictions on all three counts and
remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
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